Map of the DRC

Since the beginning of this year 2013, the security challenges in the DRC, especially in the east, are at the center of the negotiations.�The signing of the framework agreement in Addis Ababa, February 24, marked in some way, the launch of the new communication strategy of the Congolese government.�Concerning the framework agreement, the government spokesman Lambert Mende and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Raymond Tshibanda have been constantly exposing the merits and ambition of the agreement, as many its predecessors, aims to restore peace in the DRC.

As a reminder, eleven African Heads of State have signed with Ban Ki-moon, Secretary General of the UN, a framework agreement to establish peace in the DRC.�The signatories, including Rwanda and Uganda, have committed so not to support armed groups in the DRC.�The agreement also comes a series of recommendations that the DRC is committed to follow.�However, according to Lambert Mende, the agreement would have added value to focus on “��external aspects of this recurring conflictual��”.�In other words, to emphasize responsibilities other than the government, and implying the action of Rwanda and Uganda.�Desiring to justify its response to a public increasingly tired of continually renewed promises, the government has initiated the campaign “educational” to reassure and give confidence to the Congolese people.

But concerns are being fast enough to read the agreement.�Indeed, even if it requires a comprehensive approach including various countries in the region to stabilize the DRC, it nonetheless “a new agreement” as were earlier also calling for inclusive dynamic but have not, for none of them really gave measurable results and has been for over a decade.�In addition, some voices were raised denouncing the tutelage of the DRC should only commit to democratization and reconciliation with neighboring countries.�To add to that, the fact that the present day DRC, hovering over any new initiative, whether regional or orchestrated by the international community, suspicion of a hidden agenda.

The United Nations Relief Congolese government

Yet this time, the international community through the Security Council, seems to truly combine words to deeds.�On 28 March, the Council adopted resolution 2098, which aims to create an intervention brigade with an offensive term.�Enough to supply more government rhetoric of teaching the merits of the agreement in Addis Ababa went to a self-congratulatory session.�Indeed, Kinshasa believes that this resolution is nothing more than the realization of the effectiveness of its diplomacy fail of the relay in the press such as the various outputs official.�Somehow, the United Nations came to rescue the Congolese government from struggling to convince its citizens elections.�Setting movements of the Security Council on the situation in Congo then gives substance to the discourse of power up but waiting for results is high.

Moreover, the government, for some, continues to defend the indefensible, held negotiations with the M23 in Kampala while, paradoxically, the same group is listed in the 2098 resolution as one of the armed groups to fight .�What wonder what the real impact on the ground brigade UN intervention.�The politico-military imbroglio is that the reinstatements and successive desertions from the Congolese army does nothing to facilitate the action of the intervention brigade.�Then the idea of a contingent of 3,069 men from foreign countries (South Africa, Malawi and Tanzania) do what the Congolese army was never able to do for more than ten years, sounds more like a admission of failure, and military management and leadership of President Kabila, who is the head of the army.�Other more operational issues can also be raised about the actuation and collaboration of UN forces and the FARDC.�The M23 has received quite negatively the creation of the intervention brigade has already launched a campaign of intimidation in the media and to the people.

What role for Rwanda?

Finally, the text of the resolution states that “��the commitment and good faith of the signatories��to the framework agreement in Addis Ababa��. “�This argument in good faith can only worry when you know that two of the signatories are specifically accused in a report by a group of UN experts to support armed groups in the region, these armed groups that the brigade has mandate to eradicate.�In addition, the newspaper�L’Avenir,�Rwanda and Uganda are already in motion.�Indeed, the newspaper reported in 2800 and 1200 Ugandan military Rwandans who have crossed the border to take a hand in M23 and counteract the FARDC and the intervention brigade.�Without being able to certify such information, they are added to the current climate of suspicion.

And so today, the Congolese government and UN forces seem to do battle with the M23, as evidenced by recent statements by officials, the atmosphere is nonetheless sobering at the start of deployment UN.�Then, the diplomatic breakthrough Kigali does arouse fears Congolese about its next move.�Indeed, despite the opposition, Rwanda acceded, with a vote of 148 votes to 196, a seat of non-permanent member of the Security Council even to sit, since April 1, the seat the rotating presidency of the Council.While the powers of this status are limited but namely Rwanda, which for many Congolese is one of the main protagonists of the current crisis, the head of the coercive organ of the United Nations stirred speculation for some later events.

Potential scenarios

Ultimately, the framework agreement in Addis Ababa in 2098 coupled with the resolution, despite reservations about their application, are opportunities to advance the situation in the DRC.�For cons, the Congolese authorities will provide the means for concrete results to emerge and collaboration between FARDC and UN forces to be more effective and relentless transparency to begin an effective recovery of the security management in the DRC.

In a short-term dynamics, the government could easily ride the wave of the actuation of the intervention brigade to convince the public of its reactivity.�However in the medium term, the first results on the field will be critical and clarifying relationships with the M23 will also be needed.

Finally, long-term, two scenarios could emerge.�The first, more optimistic, would the government, together with the military actions on the ground, activate over expected by many citizens and especially reaffirm Congo’s sovereignty over the entire territory to dispel any plan of balkanization reforms the country.�The UN initiative could be a real force for progress in the DRC provided it is accompanied by a clear political agenda.�The second scenario is more pessimistic and wants, to some extent, in the tradition of brush fires and hype that surrounded the Congolese politics.�We would then see the government establish UN action as a screen to hide a political apathy about the structural reforms in the country and the army.�He would engage in a series of announcements and scoops to defend his record in the upcoming elections in 2016.

Source: Jambo News